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773 
THE INTER VIVOS BRANCH OF THE WORTHIER 
TITLE DOCTRINE 
JOSEPH W. MORRIS* 
Change for good reason is most appropriate. Sometimes it is superb, but 
change for the sake of change is usually wrong. It is regrettable and 
unjustifiable that an old and beneficial principle of law has been challenged 
as no longer a part of American law. Not many will know and few will 
care, but some of those who have a keen interest in the Law of Future 
Interests will be concerned. 
The Restatement of the Law of Property, Vol. III, is about future 
interests, and it was published in 1940.1 The second Restatement of the Law 
of Property 2nd, Vol. III, is also about future interests, and it was published 
in 1987.2 The Restatement of the Law of Property 3rd, Vol. III, is also 
about future interests, and it was published in 2011.3 
Each of the Restatements has a section on the Inter Vivos Branch of the 
Worthier Title Doctrine. Restatements I and II both find, in unequivocal 
language, that the Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine is a 
sound and worthwhile principle of law because it furthers the probable 
intention of the donor.4 Restatement III completely reverses those findings 
and states that the Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine is (a) 
not a part of American law and (b) is intent-defeating.5 The purpose of this 
essay is to suggest that neither of the conclusions of Restatement III is 
persuasive and to urge courts and legislatures to retain the findings of 
Restatement I and II. 
The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine has substantial 
consequences in 2016. It is not a doctrine in the category referred to by 
Justice Holmes when he said, “It is revolting to have no better reason for a 
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 1. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY (AM. LAW INST. 1940).  
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rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.”6 For 
example: If Isaac conveys land or personal property to his wife Janet for 
life and at her death, to “my heirs at law,” it is not likely that he intends to 
invest his prospective heirs or next of kin (whomever they may be) with an 
indestructible interest during his lifetime. It seems more probable that he 
intends to retain the reversion during his life so that he might dispose of it 
while he is alive or by his Will. Application of Restatements I and II 
achieve that intent by making the end limitation to Isaac’s “heirs at law” 
void and leaving the reversion in him. Application of Restatement III, 
however, defeats that intent. 
The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine in Restatement II 
is framed as follows: 
If a person purports to make an inter vivos transfer of an interest 
in real property, or of an interest in personal property, to his or 
her own heirs or next of kin, such purported transfer is a nullity 
in the sense that it designates neither a transferee nor the type of 
interest of a transferee, unless additional language or 
circumstances indicate the heirs or next of kin are to take as 
purchasers or indicate that they are to take as purchasers unless 
such person revokes the transfer to them.7  
Restatement II states that this principle of law may be illustrated as 
follows: 
O transfers Blackacre by deed “to O’s son S for life, then to the 
heirs of O.” The rule stated in subsection (1) applies. S has an 
estate for life in possession and O has a reversion in fee simple 
in the absence of additional language or circumstances that 
indicate otherwise.8  
Restatement II states that the above principle of law “is a rule of 
construction based on the inference that the average grantor does not intend 
by a limitation to his or her own heirs to create in them an interest that is 
indestructible by the grantor during the grantor’s own lifetime.”9 In other 
words, the above principle of law is a rule of construction that furthers the 
likely intention of the average conveyor. 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 30.2(1). 
 8. Id. § 30.2 cmt. d, illus. 3. 
 9. Id. § 30.2 cmt. e. 
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I respectfully submit that the purpose of this rule is justified by a 
worthwhile intention and ought to be preserved and given effect. I 
respectfully disagree with Restatement III, which states that this “doctrine 
is intent-defeating” and “has no justification in public policy.”10 
Furthermore, I respectfully submit that the giant academic scholars on 
Future Interests for the last seventy years also believed the rule to be 
justified. Those giants were the Reporter and members of the Committee of 
Advisors that addressed the Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title 
Doctrine in Restatements I and II. Restatement I states “[w]here a person 
makes a gift in remainder to his own heirs . . . he seldom intends to create 
an indestructible interest in those persons who take his property by 
intestacy, but intends the same thing as if he had given the remainder ‘to 
my estate.’”11 
Consider the identity of some of those giants: 
Richard R. Powell, Columbia University, Reporter 
W. Barton Leach, Harvard University 
A. James Casner, Harvard University, Reporter 
Lewis M. Simes, University of Michigan 
Charles E. Clark, New Haven, CT 
Stanley M. Johanson, University of Texas 
Richard V. Wellman, University of Georgia12 
Restatement II, in its Forward, states that  
[t]he exposition reflects the skill and sensitivity of the Reporter, 
Professor A. James Casner. As in earlier volumes of Donative 
Transfers, Professor Casner brings to bear both the highest 
technical legal skill and thoughtful awareness of contemporary 
social relationships. The Institute acknowledges its continuing 
debt to him in the completion of this important work. We also 
express our thanks to the members of his Advisory Committee 
                                                                                                                 
 10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 16.3 cmt. b. 
 11. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 314 cmt. a. 
 12. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ALI Committee on Property; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY ALI Officers and Council.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
776 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:773 
 
 
for their able and conscientious contributions in the drafting 
process.13  
I had the good fortune as a graduate student to sit across the table from 
Professor Lewis M. Simes and attempt to respond to his piercing and 
probing questions. I have also done a bit of work myself on the Worthier 
Title Doctrine.14 I have provided my views to the drafters of Restatement 
III.15 I attempted, before the change was made, to direct my attention to 
others of my concerns. I wrote a short essay before the final draft was 
approved with the hope that my concerns might be addressed.16 
I believe it is fair to say that Restatement III does not address the 
reasoning of Restatement I or Restatement II. It does point to the history 
and to Justice Cardozo’s decision in Doctor v. Hughes.17 This decision is 
well-known as the leading case on the Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier 
Title Doctrine. Restatement II points out that “Doctor v. Hughes has been 
widely followed by courts in jurisdictions other than New York.”18 Rather 
than addressing the rationale of Restatement II or Doctor v. Hughes, 
Restatement III simply criticizes Justice Cardozo for finding the doctrine 
applicable as a rule of construction, saying that “[s]hifting the worthier-title 
doctrine from a rule of law to one of construction is not a normal step in the 
evolutionary process of law, and it has done more harm than good.”19 Thus, 
Restatement III simply does not address the substantive reasoning of 
Restatements I and II. It also fails to establish that the Worthier Title 
Doctrine is no longer recognized as a part of American law.20 
                                                                                                                 
 13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY Foreword (emphasis added). 
 14. Joseph W. Morris, The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 2 OKLA. 
L. REV. 133 (1949); Joseph W. Morris, The Wills Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 54 
MICH. L. REV. 451 (1956). The Reporter’s note to Restatement II cites both of these articles. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 30.2, reporter’s nn.3(b), 6(b). 
 15. When Restatement III was being worked on, I wrote several letters to Professor 
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reporter, University of Michigan Law School and attempted to 
bring his attention to my concern about the direction that was being taken by the early drafts. 
I did not receive a response until after the decision was made on Restatement III. 
 16. Joseph W. Morris, The Worthier Title Doctrine: Does Draft Restatement III of 
Property Write a Premature Obituary? 45 WASHBURN L.J. 387 (2006). 
 17. 122 N.E. 221 (N.Y. 1919).  
 18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 30.2, reporter’s n.3(a).  
 19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
16.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2001). 
 20. The Reporter’s Note to Restatement III identifies eleven states that have abolished 
the Doctrine in connection with adopting the Uniform Probate Code and thirteen states that 
have done so via non-uniform statutes (i.e., twenty-four states altogether). Id. reporter’s n.2. 
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I acknowledge that some state legislatures and some appellate courts 
have abolished the Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine. Such 
a step is appropriate when a judgment is reached by such a body, but there 
are many appellate courts and legislatures that have not disavowed or 
repudiated the Doctrine. There are many courts that have not yet spoken on 
whether the rationale of Restatement I and II is, in fact, more persuasive 
than the purported reasons advanced in Restatement III. 
In short, I believe it is not justifiable when Restatement III states that 
“[t]he doctrine of worthier title is not recognized as a part of American law, 
neither as a rule of law, nor as a rule of construction.”21 Accordingly, I 
invite those jurisdictions, which have not legislated or ruled on the viability 
of the Worthier Title Doctrine, to look at the twenty-eight pages of 
discussion of the Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine in 
Restatement II and compare that discussion to the six-and-a-half pages of 
discussion in Restatement III.22 Some jurisdictions have embraced the 
Doctrine, and some have not. I respectfully urge those jurisdictions that 
have not spoken to make the comparison before they decide. 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
It further identifies two jurisdictions, Connecticut (1947) and the District of Columbia 
(1966), where courts have abolished it. Id. But the Note also acknowledges that in the last 
fifty years, courts in three states—Mississippi (1980), New Jersey (1964) and Virginia 
(1954)—have applied the Doctrine or stated that the rule is still in effect. Id. It further states 
that two state legislatures—Kansas and Nebraska—and the courts of three jurisdictions— 
Alabama (1978), Iowa (1982) and Kentucky (1940)—have abolished only the testamentary 
branch of the Doctrine. Id.  
 21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 16.3 cmt. b. 
 22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 30.2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY 
§ 16.3. 
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